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Article 5

Comments

Constitutional Problems In School
Redistricting
One national authority on the redistricting of school districts
has said this about the situation in Nebraska:
Nebraska has no good, clear-cut legislative procedure encouraging school redistricting and would be wise to get busy and pass
legislation adding incentive to consolidation.'
Unfortunately, any attempt to heed this call to legislative action is at once confronted with both socio-philosophical and legal
complications. This comment will direct its attention to the latter,
concentrating on an analysis of the constitutional feasibility of
various measures that could be enacted by the Legislature to facili2
tate the redistricting process. The present statutory structure will
3
be adverted to only incidentally.
To start out, it seems useful to imagine a situation not entirely
dissimilar to the present school district structure in Nebraska. Let
us suppose that the Legislature has established enabling legislation through which every portion of the state is organized into
school districts-thousands of them-and that each school district
has the power to levy taxes on property within its boundaries for
the support of an educational program which it alone controls.
Such a structure having been established, the Legislature becomes
convinced that it breeds great inequalities in educational opportunities and in tax burdens. The Legislature decides the solution
is simple-fewer and larger districts will give a broader tax base,
which will give more revenue to each unit, which in turn will
support a better educational program. What are the constitutional
inhibitions against the several techniques that can be used to
change existing structures? Or, to put it more dramatically, to
what extent do the existing districts (and their residents, taxpayers
1 Robert M. Isenberg, assistant secretary in the National Education Association's Department of Rural Education, quoted in The Lincoln Journal, Jan.

23, 1958, p. 5, col. 7, and in The Lincoln Star, Jan. 24, 1958, p. 19, cols. 3, 4.
Neb. Rev. Stat., § 79-101 et seq. (Reissue 1952).
3 See Bar Proceedings, 37 Neb. L. Rev. 245 (1958) for a discussion of constitutional and legal aspects of the present reorganization statutes.
2
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and parents) have a constitutionally-protected right to have the
present situation continue until the end of time?
I. CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS;
LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY
It is an oft-avowed maxim of school law that education is a
state function, as contrasted to a local matter.4 The Nebraska Constitution expressly charges the Legislature with the responsibility
for the school system.5 The state Supreme Court has verbalized
the legislative obligation and authority.0 School districts as recognized entities are accorded only incidental mention in the state
C6nstitution7 The Nebraska Court has indicated that school districts are instrumentalities of the state, established at the will of
the Legislature merely as a convenient means of discharging the
constitutional mandate to furnish free education for the youth of
the state.8 Thus, school districts exist by legislative grace and the
law-making body is free to create, restrict, alter or destroy dis9
tricts as it desires.
But this legislative power to act is narrowed by the Constitution in two ways. First, as a practical matter, the Legislature
may be displeased with the existing school district map but dis-

•Carlberg v. Metcalfe, 120 Neb. 481, 234 N.W. 87 (1930); Atty. Gen. v.
Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 26 S. Ct. 27, 50 L. Ed. 167 (1905); Edwards, The
Courts and the Public Schools (Rev. Ed. 1955), pp. 23-30.
5Neb. Const. Art. VII, § 6: "The Legislature shall provide for the free

instruction in the common schools of this state of all persons between the
ages of five and twenty-five years."
6 State v. Board of Education, 152 Neb. 644, at 648, 42 N.W. 2d 168, at 170
(1950): ".... [T] he method and means to be adopted in order to furnish
free instruction to the children of the state have been left by the Constitution to the Legislature. Clearly legislation is necessary to carry into
effect the constitutional provision. It is not a self-executing probision."
7Neb. Const. Art. VII, § 4, 7, 9.
s School District No. 49 v. School District No. 65-R, 159 Neb. 262, 66 N.W.

2d 561 (1954); Nickell v. School Board of Axtell, 157 Neb. 813, 61 N.W.
2d 566 (1953).
In both cases, this unequivocal language was cited from Hunter
v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 40, 52 L. Ed. 151, (1907),
quoted with approval in Seward County Rural Fire Protection Dist. v.
County of Seward, 156 Neb. 516, 56 N.W. 2d 700 (1953): "Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient
agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as
may be entrusted to them .... The number, nature and duration of the
powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which
they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State.

' Ibid.

COMMENTS
inclined to draw a new one itself.10 Some type of administrative
unit at the state or county level, or both, will be the alternative.
This raises constitutional questions of the validity of the delegating statute, and of the procedures which must be used by the delegee. Second, a statute or administrative decision may have the
consequence of changing the taxes of a taxpayer, or changing the
nature of the school to which a parent is compelled to send his
children under the compulsory education law. If so, the taxpayer
or parent may challenge the substantive validity of the law
against those provisions of due process, equal protection, privileges
and immunities, etc., whose essence may be distilled into a right
to judicial scrutiny of the statute or decision for arbitriness.
II. TECHNIQUES

A.

REDISTRICTING By INDIRECTION

1. Raising the Educational Standardsand Requirements
Suppose the Legislature, after a reappraisal of the state school
system, decides that the educational standards in many schools
are too low. To correct this, the Legislature passes an act whereby

Neither their charters, nor any law conferring governmental powers,
or vesting in them property to be used for governmental purposes, or
authorizing them to hold or manage such property, or exempting them
from taxation upon it, constitutes a contract with the State within the
meaning of the Federal Constitution. The State, therefore, at its pleasure
may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or
contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another
municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may
be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent
of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the
State is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the
state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the
Constitution of the United States. Although the inhabitants and property
owners may by such changes suffer inconvenience, and their property
may be lessened in value by the burden of increased taxation, or for any
other reason, they have no right by contract or otherwise in the unaltered
or continued existence of the corporation or its powers, and there is
nothing in the Federal Constitution which protects them from these
injurious consequences. The power is in the State and those who legislate for the State are alone responsible for any unjust or oppressive
exercise of it." 159 Neb. at 271, 272, 66 N.W. 2d at 565; 157 Neb. at 819,
820, 61 N.W. 2d at 571, 572.
10 The Legislature could, for example, pass an act incorporating a statewide
school district map, as it did in the case of the state highway system.
Neb. Rev. Stat., § 39-1309, paragraph 1 (1955 Cumulative Supplement).
The map could be drawn up on the basis of a study by the State Depart-
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it either (1) directly imposes specific minimum teacher and curricula standards on all districts, or (2) authorizes an administrative
agency to formulate regulations directed toward the same result.
Assume this means a deficient district will be faced with alternatives which it finds financially distasteful. The district must
either (1) hire the necessary teaching personnel and improve its
curricula and physical plant, which might mean a prohibitive tax
levy, or (2) suffer itself to become a part of another district that
already meets the standards, which action might also mean imposing a new and higher levy. Thus, regardless of the choice made,
the district will be faced with the possibility of an increased levy.
This raises the question of whether the school district, its resident
taxpayers, or parents have a standing in court to test the constitutional validity of (1) the fact of tax increase, (2) the standard,
(3) the indirect coercion applied to force the adoption of the standard, or (4) the procedure by which the standard is set.
May the school district challenge the constitutionality of the
statute? Although not directly in point, two cases growing out of
claims by municipalities carry the implication that the district
could not be a plaintiff. These cases grew out of a situation where
Gage and Dodge counties had been collecting and keeping the road
taxes which, by statute, rightfully belonged to the cities of Beatrice
and Fremont. The two cities began actions against their respective
counties to obtain these monies. Judgment was given for Beatrice.

ment of Education. Such a method might incur the objection that it
involves local legislation, particularly if the map affected some district
boundaries while leaving others intact, thus limiting the law's new scope
to particular localities. Art. III, § 18 of the Nebraska Constitution provides, in part: "The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws in
any of the following cases, that is to say: . . . Providing for the management of Public Schools." It might be noted that the court has at least
once upheld a statute that had particular geographic application. The
law, which dealt with the erection of cattle guards and gates across
roads, was effective only in a particular territory of the state. It was
attacked on the grounds that Art. III, § 18 of the state Constitution forbids
a local or special law in regard to "laying out, opening, altering, and
working roads or highways;" "vacating roads;" or "granting to any corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive privileges,
immunity, or franchise whatever." The court noted that conditions might
be different in various areas and decided that in this case the classification
made by the lawmakers was reasonable. McFadden v. Denter, 118 Neb.
38, 223 N.W. 462 (1929). The statewide comprehensive nature of a school
district map, too, would seem to enervate this kind of a constitutional
objection. See generally, 29 Neb. L. Rev. 139 (1950) and 17 Neb. L.
Bulletin 332 (1938) for a discussion of special and local legislation in
Nebraska.
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However, while Fremont's case was being litigated, the Legislature
passed a statute to authorize the counties to keep the funds and
negate the effects of the judgment for Beatrice. The Court decided
the cities had no rights as to tax funds against the state.' Hence,
it would follow by analogy, that since school districts have no rights
against the state as far as taxes are concerned, they would certainly
have no rights in connection with school policies that lead to an
12
increase in taxes.
May a taxpayer challenge the constitutionality of the statute?
An affected taxpayer would have the standard to challenge the
statute, but he has no right that his taxes not be increased; only a
right that they not be increased arbitrarily. The constitutional validity of any particular standard would, of course, be open. But the
taxpayer could not win simply by asserting that the Legislature
forced upon the district a burden which it was unwilling to assume.
As noted above, the school district is not a home rule governmental
unit, and even if it were, home rule units must yield to the Legislature on matters of statewide concern,'13 and the Court has held
14
that education is a state function.
For reasons which will be developed later, there would be a
problem of delegation involved if an administrative delegee were
setting the standards, 15 but there would probably be no constitutional requirement that the delegee give notice and hearing prior
to setting the standards.

"Beatrice

v. Gage County, 130 Neb. 850, 266 N.W. 777 (1936); Fremont v.

Dodge County, 130 Neb. 856, 266 N.W. 771 (1936). In the latter case, the
court said: "There is no ground here for the application of constitutional
restraints by a municipality against the action of the state legislature.
They do not apply as against the state in favor of its own municipalities
unless there are clear constitutional provisions to that effect." The court
cited City of Trenton v. State of New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 43 S.Ct. 534,
67 L. Ed. 937, 29 A.L.R. 1471 (1923). 130 Neb. at 869, 266 N.W. at 777.

12However, school districts as plaintiffs have been successful in actions
attacking administrative decisions as such. See School Dist. No. 228 v.
State Board of Education, 164 Neb. 148, 82 N.W. 2d 8 (1957); School District No. 39 v. Decker, 159 Neb. 693, 68 N.W. 2d 354 (1955).
13 Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 2 N.W. 2d 613 (1942).

14 Carlberg v. Metcalfe, note 4, supra.
15 In School District No. 39 v. Decker, note 12, supra, the court held unconstitutional a statute granting the Superintendent of Public Instruction
authority to "formulate rules and regulations for the approval of all
high schools for the collection of free high school tuition money." In the
course of its opinion, which invalidated a teacher-pupil minimum ratio
promulgated by the Superintendent, the court said: "Thus the Superintendent of Public Instruction has been delegated a free hand without
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2. Subsidies
A major stumbling block to permissive school reorganization
is the fact that schools are, for the most part, financed by local
property taxes. 16 Landowners in a district who enjoy a relatively
low school mill levy, for example, may be extremely reluctant to
relinquish their tax advantage for the sake of larger, more efficient
school units. This natural inclination could be softened by financial
incentives to redistrict.
One tax device tried by the Legislature in 1949 to nudge small
districts into mergers failed to clear its constitutional hurdle. The
device, a blanket mill levy tax,1 7 called for a levy in all elementary
school districts of each county to meet two-thirds of the total expenses of the districts, up to four mills. Distribution of the money
realized from this tax, however, was confined solely to those districts that had at least five students the previous year.1 8 The act
provided that each district eligible to share in the fund was to be
refunded the full amount of the tax collected in its particular district. Of the balance, two-thirds was to be divided equally among
the eligible districts. The remaining third was distributed to these
same districts on an average daily attendance basis. In Peterson v.
Hancock,' 9 the court decided the tax operated to release regular

legislative limitations or standards to make or change at will any numerical ratio or standard required for the approval of high schools for the
collection of free high school tuition money when it would have been a
simple matter for the Legislature, which had the power and authority, to
have incorporated limits and standards in the statute. As a consequence,
without questioning the motives or ability of the Superintendent of
Public Instruction, there might well be approval of some high schools
upon one standard and a withholding of approval from others by a qualification of such standard or by virtue of another. Thus, defendant... [the
Superintendent] ...had arbitrary power over the life or death of all high
schools in this state and the preservation or destruction of their property
and the grant or denial of free high school revenue, dependent upon the
granting or refusal of approval." 159 Neb. at 699, 68 N.W. 2d at 359. See
also School Dist. No. 228 v. State Board of Education, note 12, supra,
dealing with the construction of a statute. Also Part II, § C, this comment,
p. 793, infra, for a more detailed treatment of the delegated authority
problems.
1' Neb. Rev. Stat., § 79-431 (Reissue 1950). The rural character of the county
reorganization committees under the present statutory machinery is also
significant in.this regard. Id., § 79-426.05.
17 Id., §§ 79-438.01-07.
Is Except for cases where mergers were impractical. Id., § 79-438.06.
19 155 Neb. 801, 54 N.W. 2d 85 (1952).

COMMENTS
school taxes in districts with five or more pupils, 20 was discriminatory as tax levied upon one district of a county for the exclusive
benefit and local purpose of other districts, and was not uniform
21
and proportional.
Interestingly, the court quoted from Cooley, The Law of Taxation:
A state purpose must be accomplished by state taxation, a
county purpose by county taxation, and a public purpose for any
inferior district by taxation of such district ...
A state cannot tax itself for the benefit of the people of another state. So the imposing a tax on one municipality or part of
the state, for the purpose of benefiting another municipality or
part, violates the rule as to uniformity. No taxing 22district can be
taxed for the exclusive benefit of another district.
The court evidently took the view this was a local purpose tax.
Yet earlier, in Carlbergv. Metcalfe, the court had held that schools
are of statewide concern, stating:
The schools, in which are educated the children who are to become
in time the directors of our political destinies, are matters of state
concern and not of strictly municipal concern. To have educated
and intelligent men and women cannot23 be a strictly local concern.
It concerns and affects the whole state
It is submitted that the tax was essentially a state tax and
could thus be directed in the best interests of the public welfare
as the Legislature thought wise. The court said the purpose of the
tax was a meritorious one, having as its aim the inducement of
districts to reorganize, with the resultant proficiency and economy
based upon a broader and greater tax base.2 4 It is suggested that
the basic question is whether the tax is appropriated for a state

2

ONeb. Const. Art. VIII, § 4: "The Legislature shall have no power to release or discharge any county, city, township, town or district whatever,
or the inhabitants thereof, or any corporation, or the property therein,
from their or its proportionate share of taxes to be levied for state purposes, or due any municipal corporation, nor shall commutation for such
taxes be authorized in any form whatever."
21Id., § 1: "The necessary revenue of the state and its governmental subdivisions shall be raised by taxation in such manner as the Legislature
may direct; but taxes shall be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately upon all tangible property and franchises, and taxes uniform
as to class may be levied by valuation upon all other property."
22 Peterson v. Hancock, note 19, supra, 155 Neb. at 816, 817, 54 N.W. 2d at
94.
23Note 4, supra, 120 Neb. at 488, 234 N.W. at 91.
24
Peterson v. Hancock, note 19, supra, 155 Neb. at 812, 54 N.W. 2d at 92.
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purpose in promoting the statewide public welfare. 25 Reorganization and a broader tax base to equalize educational opportunities
would seem to be of primary importance to the state as a whole.
However, the decision may have been justified on a ground not
decided by the court, although noted. 26 Districts not eligible to participate in the fund could not by their own action automatically
qualify for the aid by perfecting a merger, since consent of other
districts was necessary. However, the court declined to say whether
a means for voluntary qualification would have saved the act.
Although this potentially-useful redistricting lever was struck
down, the court's language plus cases cited and distinguished in the
opinion leave room for conjecture whether the blanket tax principle
could be tailored to a constitutionally-acceptable standard. For
instance, the court said in Peterson:
The act. .. deals with both the county and all school districts
therein. They are two well-recognized separate governmental subdivisions of the state. The county was not made a school district.
It was only a taxing unit for elementary school districts therein,

Illustrative of this concept is a Maine case, in which the court said:
"The Legislature has the right under the constitution to impose an
equal rate of taxation upon all the property in the State, including the
property in unorganized townships, for the purpose of distributing the
proceeds thereof among the cities, towns and plantations for common
school purposes, and the mere fact that the tax is assessed upon the
property in four municipal subdivisions and distributed among three,
is not in itself fatal.... [Emphasis supplied.]
"The fundamental question is this: Is the purpose for which the tax
is assessed a public purpose, not whether any portion of it may find its
way back again to the pocket of the taxpayer or to the direct advantage
of himself or family.... In order that taxation may be equal and uniform
in the constitutional sense, it is not necessary that the benefits arising
therefrom should be enjoyed by all the people in equal degree nor that
each one of the people should participate in each particular benefit....
[Emphasis supplied.]
"Inequality of assessment is necessarily fatal, in e q u a 1 i t y of distribution is not, provided the purpose be the public welfare. The method
of distributing the proceeds of such a tax rests in the wise discretion and
sound judgment of the Legislature. If this discretion is unwisely exercised, the remedy is with the people and not with the court. Such
distribution might be according to population, or according to the number
of scholars of school age, or according to school attendance, or according
to valuation, or partly on one basis and partly on another. The Constitution prescribes no regulation in regard to this matter and it is not for the
court to say that one method should be adopted in preference to another."
Sawyer v. Gilmore, 109 Me. 169 at 174-178, 83 Atl. 673 at 676, 677
(1912). See also City of Louisville v. Board of Education, 154 Ky. 316,
157 S.W. 379 (1913); Miller v. Korns, 107 Ohio St. 287, 140 N.E. 773 (1923).
26 Peterson v. Hancock, note 19, supra, 155 Neb. at 812, 813, 54 N.W. 2d at 92.

25
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which remained intact as such districts, which, 'once lawfully established retain their character and territorial integrity until such
time as they shall be
divided, changed or modified in some manner
27
authorized by law.'
This language from Fremont v. Dodge County 28 was also cited:
It is true that inequality of tax assessments vitiates an act of the
legislature, but inequality of distribution of the proceeds does not,
provided the purpose be for the public welfare of the whole taxing
district.29 [Emphasis supplied in the Peterson opinion.]
In Fremont, the court sustained a county road tax levy that
was being challenged by municipalities seeking to reclaim taxes
on property within their borders. The Peterson opinion said the
purpose of the county road tax clearly was for the public welfare
of the whole taxing district.30
Another case cited in Peterson, State v. Board of County Commissioners,31 upheld the constitutionality of an act requiring the
county to furnish rooms in the courthouse for municipal courts of
any city in which the county seat of that particular county is located. This language from the case is found in Peterson:
The revenues of the county do not become the property of the
county in the sense of private ownership, and the Legislature has
authority to prescribe the division and apportionment of money,
raised by county taxation, between the county and a city within
its limits .... This is not a diversion of funds or property of the
county to the use of persons who have not contributed by taxation
to these funds. A large part of the contributions from which the
courthouse was built were furnished by the City of Omaha. It is
simply an apportionment of the use for general benefits and a
direction as to how to use the property, procured by these funds,
shall be used to the interest
and benefit of the taxpayers in that
32
particular taxing district.
The Peterson opinion immediately thereafter said "...
[s]uch
a statement clearly defines the yardstick upon which constitutionality may be predicated." 33
The benefits to the municipalities in the Fremont case lay in
the fact that the county roads brought trade to the cities.34 Benefits to the county in State v. Board of County Commissioners were
Id., 155 Neb. at 810, 811, 54 N.W. 2d at 91, citing Whelen v. Cassidy, 64
Neb. 503, 90 N.W.229 (1902).
28
Note 11, supra.
29 Peterson v. Hancock, note 19, supra, 155 Neb. at 814, 54 N.W. 2d at 93.
27

30 Ibid.
3 109 Neb. 35, 189 N.W. 639 (1922).
32 Peterson v. Hancock, note 19, supra, 155 Neb. at 814, 815, 54 N.W. 2d at 93.
33 Ibid.
34

Note 11, supra, 130 Neb. at 867, 266 N.W. at 776.
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the reduction in the county and district court loads realized by the
35
municipal court, and the accessibility of all courts in one building.
Also mentioned in Peterson was a Minnesota decision that upheld the constitutionality of a statute providing for a comparable
county school tax levy.36 The levy was to be distributed to the
school districts of the county on the basis of their respective enrollments. The Nebraska Court noted all the schools in the county
received a proportionate amount, to distinguish it from the Nebraska
act. Thus the ostensible criterion in each of the three cases cited
in Peterson was whether there was at least some benefit inuring
generally to the taxpayers of the taxing district.
In light of this, it would seem that retention of the blanket
tax while eliminating the individual school district as a taxing
unit might be acceptable to the court. The school board could be
continued solely to determine educational policy and enter contracts. The county would become the taxing district, setting one
inter-district levy for the total county school needs, rather than
37
several intra-district levies. This would change the "character"
of the individual school district from a combined fiscal-administrative agency to solely an administrative unit.
Moreover, to paraphrase language found in State v. Board of
County Commissioners, the Legislature would have authority to
prescribe the division and apportionment of money raised by county
taxation to the school districts within the county.3s
Pitting the blanket tax technique to a constitutional form by
this procedure may, nevertheless, not pass judicial inspection. The
Nebraska Court has indicated it will not confine itself to an examination of statutory form, but will evaluate constitutionality in the
light of an act's results. 39 Perhaps retaining the blanket tax as it
35 Note 30, supra, 109 Neb. at 42, 189 N.W. at 642.
36 State v. Delaware Iron Co., 160 Minn. 382, 200 N.W. 475 (1924).
37
This is in reference to language to which note 27, supra, is directed.
38 This refers to the quotation to which note 32, supra, is directed.
39
E.g., in a case in which an act was attacked as special legislation, the
court said: "In an examination into the character of an act of the legislature to ascertain whether it is general or otherwise, the determination
of the question must depend on the substance of the act, not its form."
State v. Stuht, 52 Neb. 209 at 222, 71 N.W. 941 at 945 (1897) (dictum).

See also State v. Bauman, 120 Neb. 77, 231 N.W. 693 (1930) and Galloway
v. Wolfe, 117 Neb. 824, 223 N.W. 1 (1929), in which population classification techniques failed to pass judicial scrutiny. The court has also said
the Legislature "cannot accomplish indirectly what it may not do directly." Steinacher v. Swanson, 131 Neb. 439 at 448, 268 N.W. 317 at 322
(1936). But cf. Tukey v. Douglas County, 133 Neb. 732, 277 N.W. 57
(1938).
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was enacted, but turning back to the school districts the revenue
on a proportional basis, would be an acceptable alternative. Each
district would derive some benefit and comply with the standards
found in the Minnesota case4 , cited in Peterson.
Probably a more efficient method for promoting mergers
through subsidies would lie in the distribution of a blanket tax on
a progressive basis. The amount of remission for each pupil would
increase with the district school population. Or perhaps this could
be set up on a classification basis, breaking down school population
spreads into aid categories. Justification for these approaches could
exist to the extent that costs of buildings, equipment, teachers and
transportation rise in relation to the number of pupils. Neither of
these methods should run afoul of the special legislation inhibition
41
since all districts occupying the same status would share alike.
Some means for voluntary mergers should be available, to
allow
42
any district to qualify for the extra aid if it is so inclined.
A blanket tax could also be utilized to provide extra money for
larger districts by way of (1) capital outlay for new buildings
and equipment necessitated by consolidation, (2) pupil transportation payments, and (3) additional funds for districts meeting
higher standards. 43 The first technique might be open to a constitutional objection as discriminatory against districts that have
already reorganized and built additional facilities at their own
expense.44 The other two would not be discriminatory in that respect since they would reward all soundly-organized districts.
40 Note 36, supra,
41

See State v. Berryman, 102 Neb. 553, 167 N.W. 790 (1918). Also Dorrance
v. County of Douglas, 149 Neb. 685, 32 N.W. 2d 202 (1948); Lennox v.
Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Neb. 582, 290 N.W. 451 (1940);
Dougherty v. Kubat, 67 Neb. 269, 93 N.W. 317 (1903); State v. Graham,
16 Neb. 74, 19 N.W. 470 (1884).

[A] law is not special when it applies to all citizens and persons
who may be brought under the circumstances affected thereby." Livingston Loan and Bldg. Assn. v. Drummond, 49 Neb. 200 at 205, 68 N.W.
375 at 377 (1896). This would eliminate the possible objection to which
note 25 refers, preventing any frozen class argument, as in State v.
Consumers Public Power District, 143 Neb. 753, 10 N.W. 2d 448 (1943).
43See generally Fitzwater, School District Reorganization Policies and
Procedures, pp. 88-102 (U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Special Series No. 5, 1957), for a resume of school finance in relation to
reorganization programs.
44
But see State v. Love, 89 Neb. 149, at 156, 131 N.W. 196 at 199 (1911),
where it was held that the fact that some firemen earned pensions by
serving a comparatively short time subsequent to the passage of an act,
whereas others were compelled to continue in the service for a greater
42" ...
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Although we have set consideration of these alternative devices
by setting the county as a taxing unit, and discussing redistributions
to school districts within the county, it would be equally constitutional to accomplish the same results through direct state levy, bypassing the county.
This discussion of taxing and redistribution between school
districts to accomplish legislative purposes might be mooted if a
state sales or income tax were levied. Under the present Nebraska
Constitution, such a tax would have to replace state property
taxes.45 As a practical matter, the state sales or in'come tax is not
likely to provide revenue substantially larger than is needed to perform existing state functions, and, without recourse to property tax,
the Legislature would not have available sufficient funds and taxing power to make the redistributions previously discussed a strong
incentive to redistrict.46 Even a county inter-district distribution
would be prevented, since the legal basis for spending money in
school district A raised by property tax in school district B is that
education is a state rather than a district function. As noted above,
passage of a sales or income tax precludes use of a property tax for
a state purpose.

B.

REDISTRICTING BY ANNEXATION

47

Suppose the Legislature sets up an enabling statute that permits a K-12 district (kindergarten through grade 12) to annex elementary districts, under certain conditions. Let us say that a particular K-12 district, desirous of strengthening its science and math-

length of time, did not make the legislation void. The court said:
"The constitutional limitations do not apply to such conditions. The legislature is not restrained from paying unequal compensation for official
services so long as its laws with regard thereto are general. Legislation
must be couched in general terms, and in its application exact equality
cannot always be obtained among individuals." This is capable of
analogy to the capital outlay situation, where newly-reorganized districts
might be the main beneficiaries.
45
Neb. Const. Art. VIII, Sec. IA: "When a general sales tax, or an income
tax, or a combination of a general sales tax and income tax, is adopted
by the Legislature as a method of raising revenue, the state shall be
prohibited from levying a property tax for state purposes."
46 See Comment, 32 Neb. L. Rev. 629 (1953) for an analysis of ways various
present state funds for financing schools could be rechanneled to encourage the elimination of some districts. Further questions as to Legislative authority may arise should Congress enact legislation for federal
47

aid to education.
See Comment, 32 Neb. L. Rev. 43 (1952) for a thorough treatment of
municipal annexation in Nebraska.
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ematics programs or of adding some vocational courses, decides
to annex an adjacent grade school district for the added property
tax revenue the area would offer. Are there any assertable rights
by which the taxpayers in the elementary district could prevent
such a step?
Since the annexation of property by a governmental subdivision in this state for tax purposes alone is conceived of as taking of
property for public use without just compensation, 48 it follows that
any such annexation procedure by the K-12 district must be capable
of showing some "compensation" in the way of benefits or service
to the elementary district.4 9 Such "compensation" could be predicated on the premise that the K-12 district would provide more
educative variety and quality for the elementary district student.
There is the additional problem of whether past or present educative "compensation" to the elementary district is required. Suppose the elementary district had been contracting with the K-12
district and using the high school under the free high school tuition
system. In such a case, there would be no additional benefit resulting to the elementary district as a result of the annexation. 0
However, the majority of Nebraska cases on municipalities, according to one commentator, considers benefits already accrued
as a criterion for valid annexation. 51
Another problem in connection with annexation procedures
would arise should two K-12 districts desire to annex the same
area. This question could be foregone by specifically providing
in any annexation statutory setup for such solutions as preference
elections in the annexed area, permitting the district that acts first
to prevail, or, better yet, let an administrative
agency make a
52
decision based on legislative policy guides.
C. REDISTRICTING BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
Assume the Legislature decides a general statewide reorganization should be accomplished within the shortest practicable
48

Witham v. City of Lincoln, 125 Neb. 366, 250 N.W. 247 (1933); Bradshaw
v. City of Omaha, 1 Neb. 16 (1871).

49

See City of Wilber v. Bednar, 123 Neb. 324, 242 N.W. 644 (1932); Chapin
v. Village of College View, 88 Neb. 229, 129 N.W. 297 (1911).

Also 32

Neb. L. Rev., note 47, supra, at 49-53.
50 See Village of Syracuse v. Mapes, 55 Neb. 738, 76 N.W. 458 (1898).
5132 Neb. L. Rev., note 46, supra, at 49.
52
This, of course, raises questions concerning delegation of powers. See
note 15, supra, and Part II, § C, infra.
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time and directs an administrative unit, agency or officer to carry
53

this out.

This gives rise to several questions. First, there is the inevitable
problem growing out of the separation of powers concept. 54 The
doctrine has been accorded various interpretations in the Nebraska
decisions.55 Legislative functions, the court has said, cannot be
delegated to private individuals, 6 nor to the courts.57 The Legislature may delegate administrative duties or discretion to a public
agency or officer, 58 or to a general function unit local governing
body.5 However, care must be taken to provide a standard to be

. Since the Legislature is supreme in the matter of school districts, note
9, supra, it is patent that the lawmakers could take a direct hand in redistricting. See note 10, supra. The Legislature could, for example,
abolish all districts and make each of the 93 counties in the state the unit
of local school administration. E.g., W. Va. Code of 1955, § 1724 [3],
1777 [16]; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 386.101, 386.111. Another device would be
to abolish all districts having fewer than a minimum number of school
age children and create in each county a new district composed of the
territory of the districts abolished (e.g., Ark. Stat. 1947 Ann. § 80-426),
or attach the abolished districts to existing districts. These latter techniques might be challenged as special legislation. However, since it would
affect all districts equally within a specified class, it should not be objectionable, particularly if it is a continuing device. See notes 41, 42, supra.
It could also require that all districts be K-12 units.
51Neb. Const. Art. II, § 1: "The powers of the government of this state
are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive
and judicial, and no person or collection of persons being one of these
departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of
the others, except as hereinafter expressly directed or permitted." The
State Department of Education, Board of Education, and Commissioner
of Education also occupy constitutional status. Art. VII, § 14-16. § 14
sounds self-executing, while § 15 and 16 are limited to powers given
by the Legislature. Quaere: Is § 14 inconsistent with H§ 15 and 16, or
are they cumulative?
5 See 18 Neb. L. Bulletin 368 (1939) for a discussion on the separation of
powers in Nebraska.
56
Rowe v. Ray, 120 Neb. 118 at 123, 231 N.W. 689 at 691 (1930). Also

Elliott v. Wille, 112 Neb. 86, 200 N.W. 347 (1924).
Searle v. Yensen, 118 Neb. 835, 226 N.W. 464 (1929); Winkler v. City
of Hastings, 85 Neb. 212, 122 N.W. 858 (1909).
58 Nickell v. School Board of Axtell, 157 Neb. 813, 61 N.W. 2d 566 (1953);
Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation District v. Hall County, 152 Neb. 410,
41 N.W. 2d 397 (1950).
ri Lennox v. Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Neb. 582, 290 N.W.
451 (1940).
57
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adhered to by the delegee in the administration of delegated functions. 60
Second, if the boundary adjustment decided upon by the public
body enhances taxes, must the taxpayers be given the right to vote
on the proposal? The Nebraska court has made it clear that an
election is not a constitutional necessity."' It has expressly held
that boundary lines of school districts may be altered by the county
superintendent and commissioners, after a hearing and judgment
62
based on the evidence.

Nevertheless, setting up reorganization machinery minus a
popular acquiescence requirement may invite a judicial inclination
to invalidate the legislation as too much delegation of power. 63 In
addition, elections seem to provide a procedural backstop in situations where there might be some doubt about the delegation question or sufficiency of notice. 64 Even an election is not an auto60 See School Dist. No. 39 v. Decker, note 15, supra, in which delegation

of rule-making power to the State Superintendent without adequate
standards was held unconstitutional.
A declaration of legislative policy would have considerable utility
in this regard. The court has said that the findings of the Legislature
as set out in the declaration of policy in an act, while not absolutely
controlling, are entitled to great weight. Omaha Parking Authority v.
City of Omaha, 163 Neb. 97 at 100, 77 N.W. 2d 862 at 866 (1956). See
also Lennox v. Housing Authority of City of Omaha, note 59, supra, in
which about the only statutory condition imposed on the city council
in creating a housing authority was that it determine such action was
expedient. A good model for a declaration of intent might be the one
used to preface the statutes on the state highway system. Neb. Rev.
Stat. §39-1301 (Supp. 1955).
61". .. [A] reclamation district could be established and put into operation
without the calling of an election. The Legislature might have chosen
some other mode for the formation of the district, which, if reasonable
in its terms, would be effective without the calling of an election of
property owners. .. ." State v. Hanson, 80 Neb. 724 at 734, 115 N.W.
294 at 298 (1908) (dictum).
62 Malin v. Housel, 105 Neb. 784, 181 N.W. 934 (1921). See also Nebraska
Mid-State Reclamation District v. Hall County, note 58, supra.
63
E.g., State v. Hines, 163 Kan. 300, 182 P. 2d 865 (1947), in which the
Kansas Supreme Court declared the Kansas Reorganization Act unconstitutional. However, the Kansas act had no provision requiring county
committees to consider various factors relating to the desirability of reorganization. Studies were to be made, but the law neglected to expressly require the committees to take the results into consideration
or to set up other conditions upon which the committee should act.
64 In Nickell v. School Board of Axtell, note 58, supra, in which the 1949
State School Reorganization Act was held constitutional, the court noted
that a county committee could not by itself "change, realign, or readjust
any existing school district or the boundaries thereof. That power is
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matic safeguard against constitutional objections, however, as in
the situation where private individuals may determine the boundand may thus, by gerrymandering, dearies of a proposed district
65
termine the electorate.
Third, under what circumstances is a taxpayer entitled to notice
and hearing prior to an administrative decision on an issue? The
law on this is clear; its application difficult. If an administrative
decision affecting rights (e.g., the right not to be taxed except according to law) is a judicial one, notice and a hearing are prerequisites; otherwise the decision is legislative. Some Nebraska
cases relevant to this problem of classification are:
(1) Bradshaw v. City of Omaha:66 the Nebraska Supreme Court
held that a municipal boundary extension by act of the legislature
which would subject plaintiff's unplatted agricultural property to

left with the electorate of the area involved in any proposed plan."
157 Neb. at 825, 61 N.W. 2d at 574. In addition, the court decided the
county committee had been the recipient of legislative powers and that
its actions did not fall within the federal or state due process clauses.
Id., 157 Neb. at 825, 826, 61 N.W. 2d at 574. It is not altogether clear
whether the court meant the committee could have summarily set new
boundaries (within its delegated limits), or whether the court merely
confined this discussion to the sufficiency of notice issue. Immediately
after the last cited language, the court noted, in assuming "for the purpose of discussion only, that a hearing and proper notice thereof to all
parties interested were required," that it felt the act provided for insufficient notice in providing for a hearing on the initinl ,o,- ion of
fixing the boundaries. Id., 157 Neb. at 826, 61 N.W. 2d at 574, 575.
It might also be useful to examine this language in Rowe v. Ray,
120 Neb. 118 at 122, 231 N.W. 689 at 690 (1930):
"The legislature may enact general laws providing for the incorporation of municipal corporations, such as cities, towns, villages and school
districts, and it may provide the conditions on which such municipal
corporations may be created, and leave to some officer or official body
the duty of determining whether the prescribed terms and conditions
exist, and, when found to exist, the law directs the creation of the municipal corporation. The legislature may also prescribe and fix the terms
and conditions on which such a law may come into operation. It may,
by law, provide that two school districts may merge and become one,
upon a vote of the electors of the two districts. It may and does authorize
one city to annex an adjacent suburb or village upon a majority vote of
the electors thereof, and by the consent of the municipal authorities
of the larger city. In all such cases the legislative function has been
performed. The legislature, in those cases, has fixed the terms and
conditions on which an electorate, which is definite and certain, may
determine whether the act of the legislature shall become operative. . . ." [Emphasis supplied.]
65 See Rowe v. Ray and Elliott v. Wille, note 56, supra.
66 1 Neb. 16 (1871). Cf. Wertz v. City of Ottumwa, 201 Iowa 947, 208 N.W.
511 (1926), holding that annexation is not a taking of property.
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city taxation, was judicial in so far as to permit court review of
plaintiff's contention that his property received no benefit from
inclusion in the city, and thus the city6 7taxes deprived him of property without substantive due process.
(2) Turner v. Althaus: 68 this case substantially w e a k e n e d
Bradshaw by holding that inclusion of plaintiff's property within
the boundaries of a taxing district was a matter for the legislative
branch, and raised no question for judicial scrutiny unless plaintiff
alleged the sole purpose of the inclusion was to tax plaintiff for the
benefit of others in the district.
(3) Elliott v. Wille: 69 the court invalidated an enabling statute that
called for an election on the incorporation of a special function district after certain initiating procedures by private individuals. The
court decided that the omission of a requirement for determination
by a "competent authority" of whether the incorporation would further the public welfare made it constitutionally untenable, since it
could lead to the taking of property without due process of law via
gerrymandering.0
(4) Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board of Equalization and
Assessment: 71 the court held that where an increase in the assessed
valuation of a class of property, as returned by a county, was made
by the state board without notice and hearing, the increase was in
violation of a statute and amounted to confiscation of property
without due process.
Legislation that conferred on the county superintendent, county
clerk, and county board power to make boundary changes between
school districts was struck down by the court in Ruwe v. School
District7 2 for not providing for notice and hearing. It should be
noted, however, that the court found that the enabling statute conferred judicial power upon the board.
These cases well illustrate the grey area that confronts any

Neb. 16, 30 (1871).
68 6 Neb. 54 (1877).
69 Note 56, supra.
W Ironically, the Legislature evidently took the court's hint and passed
an act that provided for district court review of any proposed district.
This, however, was held to violate the separation of powers. Searle v.
Yensen, 118 Neb. 835, 226 N.W. 464 (1929).
71 119 Neb. 138, 227 N.W. 452 (1929). Quaere: Did the court mean statutory
or constitutional due process?
72 120 Neb. 668, 234 N.W. 789 (1931). The court also said this: "Due process
of law requires notice and an opportunity to be heard, where financial
burdens are necessarily imposed on property owners by an exercise of
judicial power pursuant to specific terms of a statute. Id., 120 Neb. at
671, 234 N.W. at 790. See also Schutte v. Schmitt, 162 Neb. 162, 75 N.W.
2d 656 (1956).
67 1
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attempt to determine whether a particular action involves the taking of property.
A recent decision resolving this issue in a school redistricting
contest is Nickell v. School Board of Axtell, which held the 1949
Reorganization Act73 constitutional, stating:
Questions of public policy, convenience, and welfare, as related
to the creation of municipal corporations, such as counties, cities,
villages, school districts, or other subdivisions, or any change in the
boundaries thereof, are, in the first instance, of purely legislative
cognizance and, when delegated to any public body having legislative power, any action in regard thereto does not come within the
due process clause of either the state or federal constitutions. [Cases
cited.]
But when, as a condition to their creation or change, the public
body to which such authority is delegated must find certain facts
to exist upon which the Legislature has said depends its authority
to declare such subdivision, or any change therein to exist, then the
questions presented are of a quasi-judicial character. In such cases
a hearing must be had to determine if such facts exist and proper
notice thereof must be provided for and given to all parties interested therein.74 [Cases cited.]
The court then concluded that the duties of the county reorganization committee- authorized to act when it determines that some
reorganization of districts is "desirable" and to draw up plans, giving consideration to enumerated factors 75-did not fall within the
category to which the state or federal due process clauses have
application.7 6 This was the court's answer to a contention that
notice was insufficient.
In the recent case of Schutte v. Schmitt,77 an act which directed
the dissolution of a district under certain conditions was declared
unconstitutional for not providing for notice and hearing. The
finding of such antecedent facts is of a quasi-judicial character,
the court said. In such cases a hearing must be had to determine if
the necessary facts exist and proper notice must be provided for
all interested parties.
Two cases will serve to illustrate the fine distinction between
what is deemed to be legislative or judicial decisions. They are
Searle v. Yensen 7s and City of Wahoo v. Dickinson. 9
73 Neb. Rev. Stat., §§ 79-426.01-79-426.19
74 157 Neb. 813 at 825; 61 N.W. 2d 566 at
7

(Reissue 1950).
574 (1953).

5 See Neb. Rev. Stat., § 79-426.09 (Reissue 1950).
76 Note 74, supra, 157 Neb. at 826, 61 N.W. 2d at 574.

77
78

Note 72, supra.
Note 57, supra.

7023 Neb. 426 (1888).

COMMENTS
Searle involved the creation of a power district. The statute
provided that, upon receipt of a proper petition, the district court
should determine by a hearing whether the district should be incorporated, whether the proposed boundaries were reasonable and
proper for public convenience and welfare; change, alter and fix
the boundary lines with the idea of promoting the interest of the
district and its units; and submit the proposal to the voters if it
was satisfied on these points. The court held this an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to the judiciary.
In Wahoo, the court upheld a statute that allowed a district
court, upon receipt of a petition from a municipality, to decree annexation of territory to a municipal corporation upon a finding
either of "material benefit" to the annexed property or that "justice
and equity" required the annexation. The court decided the power
of annexation actually resided in the city, when it passed a resolution to that effect. The court said that their duty was confined to
a determination of whether the conditions
precedent (i.e., benefit
80
or justice and equity) were present.
There might be the suggestion that the only real difference
between "public welfare" and "justice and equity" lies in phonetics.
Suppose a public body privileged to adjust school district
boundaries has been given a quasi-judicial role by a particular
enabling statute. This gives rise to a fourth problem, for which it
might be useful to imagine two districts, A and B. Suppose this
public body is considering attaching a part of District A to District
B. Three groups of taxpayers will be affected by this rearrangement: (1) those in District B; (2) those in the District A area that
is proposed to become a part of District B and (3) those in the remaining part of District A. To which of these taxpayers must
notice be given?
In Ruwe v. School District,8' taxpayers were allowed to challenge the constitutionality of a statute that failed to provide for
notice and hearing, even though their land was not being detached
in a school boundary change. This was because the detachment of
another's land would have increased the school taxes of the plaintiffs.
In Seward County Rural Fire Protection District v. Seward
County,8 2 the court decided that notice to and consent by the directors of an existing district was sufficient. On the possibility that
the action might mean increased taxes for the existing district, the
80See also Bisenius v. City of Randolph, 82 Neb. 520, 118 N.W. 127 (1908).
81Note
82

72, supra.
Note 9, supra.
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court cited U.S. Supreme Court language that emphasized state supremacy in the creation, change, or dissolution of municipal corporations, regardless
of lack of consent of and consequences to
8 3
property owners.
Along the same line, a boundary contraction reduces the tax
base upon which the returns to general obligation bondholders
depend. But the bondholder's rights are subject to the paramount
legislative power to change the boundaries, at least so long as there
is some property left within the issuing district. 4 Query whether
a boundary contraction harmful to a bondholder is valid if made
under a statute passed subsequent to the bond issue.85 Presumably
the bondholder, lacking substantive rights against a contraction,
would not have the adjective right to notice and hearing.
A problem of comparatively recent origin also presents itself:
What kind of notice is now constitutionally sufficient? 86 Does the
Mullane8 7 requirement of notice reasonably calculated to apprise
interested parties of proceedings extend to the area of school boundary adjustments? The concept has thus far been extended to condetonation s and special assessment 9 proceedings. The key might
once again lie in whether the public body handling the boundary changes is deemed to be exercising a function of legislative or
judicial character. In a special assessment situation, the ostensible
theory of taxation is to apportion burden in accordance with bene83 Cited
81

in Note 9, supra.

Hustead v. Village of Phillips, 131 Neb. 303, 267 N.W. 919 (1936); Hardin
v. Pavlat, 130 Neb. 829, 266 N.W. 637 (1936).

83 Ibid.
-SO
On the question of adequate notice, the court in an early decision said:
"In controversies in regard to the boundaries of school districts, where
it is sought to change the same, it must appear that the preliminary
steps were taken not only by the presentation of the proper petitions,
but by notice of the time and place of presenting the same. These notices
should be placed in public places within each district to be affected,
and if not so posted the proceedings will be invalid. The design of the
notices is to give publicity to the proposed change so that all parties
interested may appear in favor of or to oppose such change." School
District No. 10 of Polk County v. Coleman, 39 Neb. 391 at 396, 397, 58

N.W. 146 at 148 (1894). See also 10 Neb. L. Bulletin 496 (1932), for a
discussion of due process and notice.
7
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct.
652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). See also City of New York v. New York,
New Hampshire and Hartford Railway Co., 344 U.S. 293, 73 S. Ct. 299,
88

97 L. Ed. 333 (1953).
Walker v. Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 77 S.Ct. 200, 1 L.Ed. 2d 178 (1956).

89 Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 275 Wis. 121, 81
N.W. 2d 298 (1957), 352 U.S. 948, 77 S.Ct. 324, 1 L.Ed. 2d 241 (1956).
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fits. This is not necessarily true in the case of a school district
boundary adjustment that might enhance a landowner's taxes.
School support involves a general tax burden in the interest of
the public as a whole. Nevertheless, there is at least some doubt
whether published notice would be enoughf 0 As far as federal
due process is concerned, the leading Bi-Metallic case 9' points to
the conclusion that the U.S. Supreme Court would characterize a
school district boundary change as legislative in character and
hence as not requiring notice and hearing.
III. CONCLUSION
The salutary results of statewide school reorganization could
undoubtedly be achieved by Legislative fiat with only little danger
of legal complications. However, the Legislature may be reluctant
to take such action. There are other redistricting techniques available that fall at least somewhat short of direct action by the law92
makers.
An attempt has been made to show some of the problems, both
procedural and substantive, of which note should be taken in any
attempt to enact legislation to speed up the redistricting process.
The line of constitutionality in some instances is exceedingly fine,
if not altogether indiscernible. Nevertheless, it seems apparent that
taking cognizance of some of the past difficulties in weaving any
one of these techniques into statutory form would play a large role
in determining whether any method will attain judicially-acceptable fruition. 93
Charles G. Luellman, '58
90

Neb. Rev. Stat., §§ 25-520.01-25-520.03 (Supp. 1957) and Bar Proceed-

ings, 37 Neb. L. Rev. 232 and 240 (1958). Also Comment, 32 Neb. L. Rev.
432 (1953).
Bi-Metallic Investment Company v. State Board, 239 U.S. 441, 36 S.Ct.
141, 60 L.Ed. 372 (1915).
92 No attempt has been made to assess the practical merits of any of the
discussed techniques. E.g., the blanket tax principle may induce only
limited redistricting-to the extent that districts might proceed in mergers only to the point where cost and revenue coincide, and might
further reject a redistricting for non-economic reasons.
93 The court has indicated it will look to language in such matters as determining whether a device violates the separation of powers concept. It had
this to say in Ruwe v. School District, 120 Neb. 668 at 671, 234 N.W. 789 at
790 (1931): "Whether the county tribunal was required to act judicially
in determining the facts and equities essential to an order detaching a
quarter section of land from district 43 and annexing it to district 35
depends upon the language of the legislature." [Emphasis supplied.] In
some cases where legislation ran into trouble, obvious procedural
remedies were available. See School District No. 39 v. Decker, notes 12
and 15, supra, and Schutte v. Schmitt, note 72, supra. The court has
91

also manifested an inclination to go along with the spirit of reorganization legislation. See cases cited in note 8, supra.

